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INTRODUCTION 
The u.s. Department of Defense (DoD) determines the warfighter's needs with a 
capability-driven process, in which a capability is defined as the ability to achieve 
a desired effect by performing a set of tasks under specific conditions to a desired 
level of perfonnance. The capability-based needs analysis is governed by the Joint 
Capability Integration Development System (JClDS). The focus on developing 
capabilities is a departure from the DoD's previous acquisition approach that 
focused on defining requirements to address individual threats (Walker, 2005). 
A rationale for the capability-based approach is that, unlike during the Cold War 
when most military planning was to counter a Icnown Soviet threat, the current 
geo-political environment is more fluid and adversaries and military needs are 
more difficult to predict. A capability can potentially address multiple, unforeseen 
military threats with a source and nature that are rapidly changing in the global 
environment. Moreover, the capabilities-driven process considers affordability 
in that it detennines whether a non-materiel solution achieved through doctrine, 
organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOT_ 
LPF)' can close any identified capability gaps, or whether a materiel solution 
(e.g., a new system) is required. The shift in perspective from previous approaches 
that anal}'%ed the needs to address a particular threat is that capabilities-based 
analysis targets a broad nnge of threats, is not biased to a materiel solution, and 
is joint between the services. Ideally, the definition and acquisition of capabilities 
across all the services leads to a military that minimizes redundancy and increases 
affordability, while proViding a broad range of capabilities to the U.S. 
Capabilities are defined in conjunction with a concept of operations, Icnown 
as a CONOPS, that broadly describes how a military commander intends to per-
fonn an operation. Nowadays, the operational context is often based on network-
centric warfare principles. Network-centric warfare involves the networking of 
geographically dispersed forces that exploit shared information to achieve their 
military objectives (Anonymous, 2005). Friedman (2009) places the conceptu-
alization of network-centric warfare as the natural outcome of the evolution of 
sensor, networking, and computer technology, starting with World War I. What 
has changed is that infonnation technology now enables us to have an expanded, 
real-time picture of the battlefield and to communicate and make decisions faster, 
which coUectively speeds up the observe, orient, decide, and act cycle of warfare. 
'The "M" (or materiel is omicted to emphasize the non·materiel solutions. 
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• Deriving capability needs for a system-of· 
systems (50S) is more challenging than for 
traditional systems because many of the 
component systems already exist, they are 
acquired and managed separately from 
the 505, and the way that component 
systems interact to deliver .capabilities is not 
intuitive. This paper proposes a capability 
needs analysis method for 505 chat links the 
performance of the component systems 
into a single Markov model amenable to 
analysis. We demonstrate the modeling 
approach using che notional design of 
an anti-ship ballistic missile defense 50S. 
For the notional system, we calculate the 
measures of effectiveness and performance 
for the system. We describe how the model 
can be incorporated into existing systems' 
engineering practice. We argue that there are 
insufficient methods and tools for analyzing 
50S in an integrative fashion, and the 
proposed modeling method for conducting 
a 50S capability needs analysis provides 
a mathematically eleganc and promising 
approach [0 do this. 
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One result of the capability·driven needs anolysis 
coupled with network-centric warfare principles is that 
we are seeing'that many new capabilities can often be 
acquired through what is called a System-of·Systems 
(SoS) that leverages existing systems as well as new sys-
tems and integrates them with corresponding changes in 
DOT _ LPF to provide a new capability. Network·centric 
warfare leads almost naturally to a SoS approach because 
it is realized by many sensors, platforms, and weapons 
that are all networked together with appropriate com-
mand and control that delivers the network·centric vision 
of a shared battlespace awareness. A SoS is a system that 
is composed of other systems such that the component 
systems, if removed, can operate independently, although 
their operation is normally subordinated to the SoS 
(Dahmann et al., 2008). Network·centric principles allow 
for the distribution of kill chain functions among different 
systems that interoperate, 
Performing a capability needs analysis that results in a 
SoS is fundamentally different than an analysis that leads 
to a single system (Dahmann and Baldwin, 2008). The 
reason is that the constituent systems already exist, often 
are managed and maintained under a separate authority, 
and the allocation offunctions to constituent systems 
may be less than optimal. The requirements engineering is 
complicated because the tradeoffs include the traditional 
trades in a system with the addition of trades between the 
systems (Keating et ai, 2008). Essentially, the SoS is a 
concept overlayed onto the constituent systems that are 
integrated together to provide new capabilities. Ubnost 
importance in realizing the operational effectiveness of a 
SoS is the ability of the separate systems to interoperate 
and work together to provide the capability (Garrett et 
al., 2011). SoS capabilities are not simply the sum of the 
component system capabilities. Capability needs analysis 
for a SoS requires understanding the capabilities of all the 
component systems and then how they interact together 
to deliver the desired capability. Moreover, the capabili-
ties provided by a materiel solution (i.e., a system) must 
be analyzed in conjunction with non·materiel solutions. 
Finally, the acquisition of capabilities with a SoS is via evo· 
iutionary acquisition str.1tegy, often over many years, that 
shifts the emphasis from developing a single, stand·alone 
system to developing a capability through the interoper· 
ability of multiple, distributed, and mission·oriented 
systems from the sea, air, and land, all working together. 
Modeling and anolyzing the emergent SoS behavior 
due to the interactions between systems is less developed 
than comparable tools for traditional systems. Many of 
the component systems will have associated physics-
based models, analytical models, and simulation models 
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that were used during the systems engineering process 
when the component systems were initially developed. 
Our premise is that models for component systems exist, 
and ideally we could leverage these existing models to 
analyze the SoS without recreating them. This paper 
shows how a Markov model can be used to model and 
analyze the interconnection between systems in the 505, 
and how the performance of one system affects the overall 
measure of effectiveness (MOE) of the SoS. The purpose 
of the capabilities analysis is to derive and allocate capa· 
bility requirements to the constituent systems. We pres· 
ent a method that starts with the operational architecture 
defined by a design reference mission and its associated 
operational situations. The ltiU chain for the system, 
derived in the operational architecture, is transformed 
into a Markov model that allows behavior analysis of the 
states of the system and timing performance. The method 
utilizes both analytical equations to perform behavior 
analysis of the system states, and Monte Carlo simulation 
to perform timing analysis. We illustrate the method and 
model by performing a capabilities·based analysis for a 
SoS to defend against anti· ship balUstic missiles (ASBM). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
the background of capability needs analysis for SoS as 
being mostly conducted vi. modeling and simulation. 
Section 3 discusses anti.ship missiles, how they oper-
ate, and how ships can defend against them. Section 4 
presents the SoS Capabilities model. It examines the 
components of a SoS for ASBM defense, describes the 
Markov model used to analyze the SoS, and presents the 
equations. Section 5 uses notional data to illustrate how 
the model can be used to perform a capability needs 
analysis. Section 6 presents the conclusions and describes 
future research. 
Capability Needs Analysis MethDds fDr SoS 
A capability. based analysis (CBA) is conducted in 
conjunction with a concept of operations that defines the 
mission and threat scenarios. The CBA identifies the capa-
bilities required to complete the mission, determines the 
standards for performance of those capabilities, identifies 
and prioritizes the gaps between current capabilities and 
needed capabilities, and identifies and analyzes potential 
non·materieland materiel solutions to close the gaps. A 
CBA is conducted as part of the )CIDS process, early in 
the acquisition timeline. At this early phase, options to 
conduct the analysis include subject matter expert review, 
researching and benchmarking similar capabilities and 
mission scenarios, and modeling and simulation. 
Most, if not all, CBA will involve some type of subject 
matter expert (SME) review. SMEs are especially needed 
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to help define the mission scenarios under which to ana· 
Iyze the capabilities and also to perfonn the non-materiel 
DOT _ LPF analysis. SME review can be via individual 
analysts examining the scenarios, or structured as a team 
exercise. The analyses conducted by Solomon (2011) and 
Scballer (2006) illustrate individual expert review of pos-
sible doctrine and ASBM strategy and tactics, drawing on 
analysis of historical engagements from recent conflicts. 
Instead of individual review, Harney (2010) describes the 
use of military teams assuming the roles of adversaries 
and making decisions. These and similar SME reviews are 
good at comparing alternatives and reducing an immense 
set of alternatives quickly. However, given that many SoS 
capabilities are due to the complex interaction of system 
components, how to derive capability needs is frequently 
not intuitive or readily apparent to the subject matter 
experts. The SME review and analysis is subjective and 
due to the low lidelity and analytical rigor, these methods 
alone are insufficient to perform the analysis necessary 
to derive and allocate requirements to the constituent 
systems. Consequently, while most all CBA will involve 
SME review, we still need models that can capture the 
interaction between component systems to support capa-
bility needs analysis of SoS. 
The primary modeling challenge to support analysis of 
50S is representing the interconnection between systems. 
Garrett et aI. (2011) discuss the problem and introduce 
the idea of using a network model, although they provide 
no example of how it could be applied. Kaminer and 
Ben-Asher (2010) describe an analytical modeIfor a two-
layer defense network that captures the interconnections 
between layers. More common are simulation models. 
Pavalko et at (2000) desctibe analysis of theater ballistic 
missile defense using simulation but of a stand-alone sys-
tern. Holland and Wallace (20ll) describe an agent-based 
simulation model that investigates active defenses for bal-
listic missile defense. The model concentrates on radar per-
formance and its communication with other component 
systems. Enders et aI. (2010) propose a modeling approach 
that interposes a neural network to act as a surrogate model 
replacing higher-lidelity models. They demonstrate the 
modeling approach for ballistic missile defense. While it is 
technically feasible to build a single monolithic simulation 
model of a 50S, it requires significant effort to build the 
initial model, and then continuous effort to maintain and 
update the models as the 50S evolves. Moreover, it fails 
to leverage the likely existence of models for the compo· 
nent systems. Mittal et aI. (2009) seek to reuse existing 
simulation models of component systems by interopera-
tion of the simulation models. The interoperability and 
reuse of simulation models has long been a 000 goal and 
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is intended to be supported by the High Level Architec-
ture (HLA) (Dalunann et al., 1997). However, Fowler 
and Rose (2004) say that software vendors have largely 
not implemented the standard and true plug.and·play 
interoperability. which would be desirable for SoS analysis, 
remains unrealized. 
The 000 commissioned a study to understand the 
obstacles to the reuse of simulation models that found 
it is still an open problem due to business reasons, such 
as proprietary ownership of the model, as well as due to 
technical reasons (Shea & Graharo, March 2009). We 
observe that integrating multiple simulation models of 
components systems to analyze the 50S is likely to have 
prohibitive cost and involve Significant risk. 
Generally, the greater the model's lidelity, then not 
only the greater effort and cost required to develop the 
model, but also the more data are required in order to 
use the model. A high fidelity model, without valid input 
data, is no better than a lower fidelity model. Observ-
ing that modellidelity only needs to be sufficient for the 
purpose of the analysis it must support, this leads us to 
conclude that the users of a model should catefully con-
sider what they need to analyze and what is required in 
terms of fidelity, and then select the appropriate model. 
Spanning early architectural decisions through detailed 
engineering design, model requirements increase in the 
need for greater lidelity. This paper is aimed at the capa-
bility analYSis for SoS and the allocation of requirements 
to individual constituent systems. We believe the model 
can support such requirements allocation, although we 
envision its application as part of a suite of models of 
varying lidelity. The model might be used to initially allo-
cate requirements for probability of detection and time 
to detect a radar; then in subsequent phases, through 
greater analysiS with higher lidelity models, perfonnance 
infonnation can be fed back into the SoS model to update 
the overall analysis. 
Anti-Ship Missile Defense 
Anti-ship missiles (ASM), both cruise and ballistic, are 
a growing threat for ships operating worldwide. Schulte 
(1994) collected data of aIIASM attacks on ships up until 
1994, and he found that when the ship actively defended 
against the missile attack, the probability of ~ successful 
defense was about 75%. Yet, when Schulte (1994) exam-
ined his data by date, the data exhibited an upward trend 
of successful ASM attacks, suggesting ASM capabilities 
are increasing faster than ship defenses against them. The 
threat has only increased since that time because many 
countries, as well as non-state actors, now have access to 
sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles and these are easily 
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employed, :IS demonstr.lted by Hezbollah's success in hit· 
ting an Israeli co.rvette 15 !un offshore!" 2006. Moreover, 
Hamey (2010) argues that future U.S. Navy operations 
are likely to occur in the littorals where they will be 
exposed to land·based missiles that greatly increase the 
number of missiles to defend against His analysis does 
not even consider the recent advances by China on the 
Dong Feng (DF) 21 anti· ship ballistic missile (ASBM) 
that greatly extends the reach ofland·based missiles to a 
range of up to 2000 !un (Broad and Sanger, 2010). 
An ASBM is a theater.range ballistic missile deSigned 
10 destroy a ship. A ballistic missile tr.ljectory is usually 
described by three phases: the boost phase during which 
it leaves the atmosphere, the mid·course phase during 
which It coasts toward the target, and the lerminal phase 
in which it re·enters the atmosphere at a very high speed. 
Nonnallya ballistic missile re·enters the atmosphere 
under the force of gravity alone and follows the trajec· 
tory calculated when it was launched. Anti·ship ballistic 
missiles, on the other hand, require the capability to 
maneuver during the terminal phase, because during the 
time between launch and re·entry into the atmosphere 
the targeted ship will have moved. Many of the capabili. 
ties for defending against ASBM also help defend against 
ASM in general.-The main differences are the time win, 
dows for reaction, 10·15 minutes for ASBM versus less 
than a minute for ASM, and also the fact that ASBM leave 
and re·enter the atmosphere. Given the ASBM's high 
speed, apprOximately Mach 10·12 upon reentry, it poses a 
severe challenge to existing shipboard defensive systems. 
Due to the severity of the ASBM threat, most every 
published analysis discusses a multi·layered approach 
of passive defense that provides a soft·kill and active 
defenses that provide a hard·kill. Yet, there seems to be 
an over.riding emphasis on active defenses of shooting 
the ASBMs before they reach their target (Hoyler, 2010; 
Solomon, 2011; Broad and Sanger, 2010). This is actually 
counter to the data presented by Schulte (1994), which 
found that prior to 1994 only a single hard·kill was sue· 
cessfully demonstrated in actual combat scenarios with 
the remainder being successfulsoft·kill defenses of the 
ASM with electronic countenneasures, such :IS chaff and 
other tactics. In a more recent analysis, Harney (2010) 
analyzes the various ship defensive strategies and finds 
that neither passive nor active defenses can bring the 
probability of being hit down to acceptable levels. For this 
reason, he concludes that ship design must pay greater 
attention to ship survivability, because under massed mis-
sile threat scenarios the ships will likely be hit by multiple 
missiles. However, this does not preclude first trying to 
avoid being hit by a missile. 
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The mission capability to defend against ASBM is pro· 
vided by a SoS involving constituent systems for detec· 
tion and tracking; command, control, and communica-
tions; and pasSive defenses and active defenses. ASBM is 
an acknowledged SoS because the component systems 
have reCOgnized objectives, program management, and 
resources separate from the identity of the SoS. 
A capabilities analysis for ASBM defense must examine 
both the kill chain of the attacker as well as the kill chain of 
the defender for negating the ASBM. The reason is ASBM 
defense needs to attack all components of the attacking 
missile's kill chain. The ASBM kill chain is: detect target; 
track and identify target; decide to engage, launch, and 
maneuver to target Given the large range of the ASBM, 
detection requires maritime surveillance and targeting 
systems to find, identify, and classify target ships and 
relay the infonnation back to the ASBM launch facilities. 
Such systems may include over·the·honzon backscatter 
(OTH.B) radars, land·based over·the-horizon surface wave 
(OTH.SW) radars, electro-optical satellites, radar satel· 
lites, and seabed sonar networks. Once detected, the target 
infonnation is relayed to the launch control facility, which 
makes the decisions on whether to engage, how many mis· 
siles to use, and from where. Once the missile is launched 
and gnes thmugh the boost phase, it will need to regain and 
lock onto the target so that it can maneuver for the kill It 
is highly probable that missiles will include countennea· 
sures .gainst possible ship defenses, such as multiple decoy 
warheads and other str.ltagems. 
The defense against ASBM includes soft·kiII and hard· 
kill methods. AU ships will utilize cover and deception 
(C&D) counterme:lSUres that prevent the attacker's sur· 
veillance and reconnaissance sensors from detecting the 
ship. C&D will occur over long periods of time involving 
hours, days, or even weeks. C&D includes controlling 
ship's electromagnetic emiSSions, employing deception 
emittersJ and jamming adversaries' maritime surveillance 
and space.based remote sensing. Some new ships are 
designed with stealth technology to reduce their radar 
signatures. Additionally, defending ships will employ 
.ctive electronic countenneasures (ECM), usually as 
tr.lnsmissions from the shipboard electronic warfare 
systems, active decoys, and passive "reOecting" off·board 
decoys to blind or deceive the attacker and prevent detec· 
tion and identification of the ship. ECM also confuses the 
attacker and degrades their tactical battlespace aware· 
ness so that their increased uncertainty incr~ses the risk 
involved with the decision to launch. For example, con· 
fusing the adversary into launching valuable and limited 
missiles at a decoy, or into making poor decisions on how 
many missiles to launch. 
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Once a missile launch is detected by the defending 
ship, the shipboard EW systems will continue to be used 
against the missiles guidance systems to cause the missile 
to veer away from the torget ship, attempt to break the 
lock, and cause the missile to miss. Additionolly, hard·1tiII 
tactics will be employed against the attacking missiles. 
Hard·1tiII countermeosures are provided by the Navy's 
Aegis.designated ships, which include two interceptor 
missiles: the Standard Missile·3 (SM.3) and the Standard 
Missile·2 (SM.2) for interception during the mid·course 
and terminal phoses of the enemy ballistic missile, 
respectively. In addition to its organic capabilities, Aegis 
can also interoperate with other sea·bosed and land·bosed 
sensors via the Cooperative Engagement Capability 
(eEC) to receive cues and provide information to create 
better battlespace awareness and inereose the probability 
of effective intercepts of incoming missiles. 
In ASBM, defense the goal is to prevent enemy missiles 
from hitting the ship. The primary MOE is the probability 
of a missile evading .0 defensive meosures and hitting the 
ship- sometimes coOed a leaker. Meosures of perfor· 
mance include the average number of ASBM missiles 
ltiIIed, the probability ofltilling an incoming missile, and 
the total inventory expended. These measures drive the 
capability needs analysis conducted in the next section. 
SoS Capability Needs Analysis Framework 
A capability needs analysis for ASBM defense must 
determine how the overoll SoS effectiveness and perfor· 
mance is realized through the constituent systems and 
their interactions. The framework's goal is to analyze 
the interactions in the 50S and allocate requirements to 
constituent systems. Figure 1 shows the overoll frame· 
work for SoS capability needs analysis with the circled 
numbers indicating the sequence. A design reference 










FIGURE 1. 50S Capability Needs Analys~ Framework 




mission and associated scenarios, called operational 
situations (OPSITs), is used to define and document 
the mission. The performance of constituent systems is 
input to the SoS model. In our example, these are the 
probabilities aod time duration distributions associated 
with the performance of each constituent system. One or 
more meosures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of 
performance (MOP) define quantifiable criteria for the 
SoS. The effectiveness of the SoS is analyzed across .0 the 
possible ",enarios. Then tradeoff analysis is performed to 
allocate the requirements to constituent systems. 
The analysis of the SoS depends on the type ofSoS and 
the mission scenarios. For many military SoS, the overoll 
50S effectiveness depends on the performance of each 
constituent system, defined by meosures of performance 
(MOP), and how they interact. In theASBM illustration, 
we show how these can be analyzed. Often, the capabilities 
needs analysis must also consider the performance of the 
adversary'S systems in the analysis. This is done here for the 
case of ASBM defense. The framewod< components are 
described in greater detail in the following subs~ons. 
DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION 
A design reference mission (DRM) defines a threat and 
operational environment that essentially describes the 
problem situation that is being analyzed to define capabil· 
ityneeds. Included in the DRM are multiple OPSITs to 
define selected operational situations. Ideally. a range of 
OPSITs are included in the analysis to perform an encom' 
passing capability needs analysis. For illustrative purposes, 
we consider two extreme scenarios of a single missile 
launch site attacking a single ship and a raid attack scenario 
on a typical aircraft carrier strike group (CSG) that consists 
of an aircraft carrier, one Aegis cruiser, two Aegis destroy· 
ers, one submarine, and support ships. The number of 
P~rformance paramltterl used u 
Input d.ta to Mlrkov mod~II~ .... 
.... probablVof slnll~hot kill, time) 
~ 
DODD 
Higher.fldelity models of 
constttuent systems 
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missUes in a raid attack is based on reasoned speculation. 
A hard upper limit on a raid size is the number of missUes 
avallable. Solomon (20ll) collected data from defense 
reports in the Y"ars 2005·2010 to estimate the number 
of possible ASBM in the Chinese arsenal to be between 
85·95 in 2010 (Solomon, 2011, p. 26) and upwards of 140 
by 2020 (Solomon, 2011, p. 29). Within the upper limit, 
the size of a raid depends on the adversary's strategic goals, 
future intentions, expected probability of success, and 
how many missUes are needed to achieve the tactical goals. 
Solomon argues for a raid of 18 missUes against a carrier 
strike group based on an assumption that 50% of the mis-
sUes will hit a ship in the absence of EW and at least three 
hits are necessary to disable a carrier. A missUe brigade 
has about 17 launchers- although it is possible that a raid 
attack could be launched simultaneously from more than a 
single brigade location. Given the uncertainty in the size of 
a raid, we analyze scenarios for 10, 20, and 50 simultaneous 
missUe launches. 
ANAlYSIS MODEL 
Figure 2 models the ASBM kill chain as a stochastic 
process using a Markov chain, which is a particular type 
of state-transition diagram. The rounded rectangles 
represent the system state. Each arc in the model is 
labeled with a transition probability P,}, which denotes 
the probabilitY of transition from state i to state j. Initially, 
the defender is searching for the target, which is state I 
in the Markov chain. The system can transition to target 
detected with probability Pl;v to target lost with prob-
ability PII.'; or continue searching with probability p,.,.If 
the target is detected, then it transitions to the state target 
identified with probability p". The system tracks the 
target and computes a fire control solution with probabU-
ity PM to transition to ready to engage. Once a decision to 
engage is made, the system transitions to missile launch. 
The next states describe the states of the enemy's incom-
ing missile as the three phases of boost, mid-course, and 
terminal phases. From each phase of the enemy's missile 
launch there is a probability the missile can be destroyed 
given by P6,II' P7,JU and P .. ", respectively. If the enemy mis· 
sile is not destroyed, then the enemy missile either hits 
the tilrget or misses the target. 
The system states are either transient states or absorb-
ing states, the latter sometimes called tenninating states. 
Transient states are those sbtes that the system passes 
through and include states 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, and 12. 
Absorbing states are states that, if the system enters that 
state, it never leaves the state. In this case, the system 
has three absorbing states of missile destroyed (state 9), 
target missed (state 10), and target hit (state ll). The 
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model describes the kill chain as a series of state transi-
tions, starting with searching, until the kill chain reaches 
one of the absorbing states. Mathematically, what we have 
described is a terminating Markov chain (Solberg, 2008). 
Based on the Markov chain, we can analyze many 
important measures of perfonnance and effectiveness just 
by knowing the transition probabilities. To do the analy-
siS, the transition proba.bilities are represented in a square 
matrix P that can be partitioned into four sub-matrices as 
p = [[Q] [Rl] 
[01 [11 (I) 
The square matrix Q contains the probabilities between 
the transient states_ The sub-matrix R contains the proba-
bilities to go from transient states to absorbing states. The 
square matrix I is the identity matrix and corresponds to 
the absorbing states. The sub-matrix (01 is all zeros. 
The probability of reaching each of the absorbing states 
is described by the vector A and is calculated as 
A=(I-Q)"R (2) 
We can also determine the vector of probabilities of 
transitioning to transient state j starting from any initial 
state, denoted as fj. The calculation requires a modifica-
tion of the matrix Q with a column of zeros replacing the 
originalj~ column. The modified matrix is denoted as Q'j 
and the.i'" column vector is denoted as qj' The column 
vector rj of probabilities is calculated as 
(3) 
This calculation is useful to determine how frequently 
the missile defense system can interfere with the detect 
and tracking functions and have the system transition to 
the target lost state, whicl1 is a transient state of interest in 
the kill chain_ 
To perform a kill chain analysiS, the probabilities P,} in 
matrix P describe the unhindered transition probabili-
ties, or in other words the transition probabilities of the 
adversary's kill chain in the absence of any defenses. The 
active and passive defenses of the ship against the altack-
ing missiles would have two effects on the kill chain. The 
first effect is the reduction in the transition probabilities 
along the kill chain. For example, ECM will reduce the 
transition probabilities of searching to detection, detec· 
tion to identification, and mid-course phase to terminal 
phase due to the missiles inability to regain the ship's 
track and make corrective maneuvers. The second effect 
of defensive measures is an increase in the transition 
times between states. ECM interferes with the adversary's 
search and detection capabilities, and will nuse it to take 
longer to obtain a track. 
NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL 
System of Systems CapabIlIty Needs Analysis VIa a Stochastic Network Model 
Analysis 
The purpose of this paper is to present a method to 
support capability needs analysis and requirements 
determination for a 505- not to analyze the particular 
scenario. In this section} we use notional data sufficient 
to illustrate the 50S capability needs analysis model. 
We first analyze the MOEs dealing with the probability 
of success. Afterward, we analyze separately the timing 
requirements in order to successfully deliver the needed 
capability. We assume the threat missiles will hit their 
target, unimpeded, with a probability of 0.95 and that the 
threat launch facility will drop tracks with a probability 
of 0.05. We assume a 0.2 probability that a track is lost 
before transition from the Decide state. In our first analy-
sis} we assume current capabilities are such that incom~ 
ing missiles are shot down only during the mid·course 
ph.se with a probability of single-shot kill, denoted as 
P .... which in this study we use the operation.1 test results 
given by 19 successes out of23 attempts, which leads to 
a 0.826 probability of Single-shot kill. When targeting 
FIGURE 2. Anti·ship missile kill chain. 
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an incoming missile, the defending ship cannot know. 
priori whether the incoming missile will be successful or 
not. Consequently, some of the incoming missiles that 
are destroyed would have missed the ship, anyway. Let 
p, denote the probability an ASBM hits its target in the 
.bsence of any defenses. Then, the transition probability 
that an enemy missile in mid·course reaches the tenninai 
phase is given by 
p" = (1- P .. )(P.) = (1 - 0.826)(0.95) = 0.1653 
and the probability that a missile in mid-course cannot 
detect and regain the ship's track and consequently miss is 
P,." = (I - P .. )( I - p,) = (I - 0.826)( I - 0.095) = 0.0087. 
We assume that half the incoming missiles will evade 
defenses and hit the target (0.95)(0.5) = 0.475 as the 
transition probability from the terminal phase to the hit 
state. The prob.bility of missing is consequently, 
(I - 0.475) = 0.525. Again, all these values are notional 
in order to illustrate the analysis method. 
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Other than these probabilities, many of the transition probabilities are 1 or certainty. indicating that transition to 
the next state win occur. In these cases, the parameter of interest is the holding time in the state, which is analyzed 
later. The baseline transition probabiUty matrix P corresponding to the states defined in Figare 2 is: 
'SearCti~" Losi "'" DOt.a· Id~' Decide.> Launch BooSt Mld·Cr.; Term Hlf Miss Destroy 
~searitil 0 0 1 0 0 I ~ ' fast' ,I 1 0 0 0 0 
Detect- 0 0.05 0 0.95 0 
faentliv, o · 0.2 0 0 O.B 
Declae 0 0 0 0 0 
Launch1 0 0 0 0 0 
B-005t'' 0 0 0 0 0 
Mid:'Crs! ,. . 0 0 0 0 0 












I Miss 0 0 0 0 0 Destrov 0 0 0 0 0 
The four sub·matrices identified in Equation 1 are 
delineated by the soUd line. To have the same layout as in 
Equation 1, the states are re-ordered with the Lost state 
inserted second, leaving only absorbing states as the last 
columns and rows of the ma!rlL The top-left sub-matrix 
is It the top right is R, the bottom left is [01 , and the 
bottom right is I. 
OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
Using Equation 2 with the data in P, we calculate the prob-
abilities for each of the temainating states as 0.017 (1.7%) 
attacking missiles miss, 0.826 (82.6%) are negated by the 
SM-3 missiles, and 0.157 (15.7%) of the attacking missiles 
penetrate the defenses and hit the ship. These values are 
shown in the first rowofTable 1. In the single.threat mis-
sile scenario, the interpretation is that a missile has a 15.7% 
chance of hitting the ship. The 15.7% chance of a missile 
penetrating defenses is deemed too high, and current doc· 
trine says that two SM-3 missiles are used to intercept each 
incoming threat missile. Under this scenario the prob· 
ability ofkill increases. To detemaine the probability ofkill 
with. missile launches (.=2 in this scenario), we use the 
binomial distribution as follows 
P' = 1- (~) P~ •• (1- p ... l'ft-OJ (4) 
Launching two SM-3 missiles against each incom· 
ing missile increases the probability of destroying the 
incoming missile ftom 0.826 to 0.970. Using this value 
in the Markov model and repeating the calculations, the 
probabiUty of an ASBM penetrating defenses and hitting 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 
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0 H= 1 F! ~: -0 0 0 0 0 0 
the ship is 0.027 (2.7%). This greatly improves the ship's 
defenses, but at the cost of extra missiles, which in 74.3% 
of the cases the second missile is not needed. In the raid 
scenario analyzed later, we take into consideration avail~ 
able missUe inventories. 
A last consideration is how electronic warfare (EW) 
elements can be incorporated into the SoS and improve 
the ship's defenses. EW has impact on multiple aspects 
of the kin chain. Ship stealth, decoys, and active jamming 
makes it more ditlicult for the adversary's radar to detect 
and then track the ship. EW also will cause more ASBM 
to miss because they will be unable to regain the ship's 
track and make the necessary maneuvers to their trajec-
tory for a kill. Harney suggested that EW could negate 
50% of all ASBM, so for purpose ofiUustration, using 
this value we revise the probabilities: search to detect = 
0.5, detect to identify = 0.5, mid·course to term = 0.087, 
mid·course to miss = 0.087, and mid·co""e to destroy = 
0.826, for a single SM-3In response. We leave the termi· 
nal phase probabiUties under the assumption that if the 
missile makes it here, it is unlllcely to miss. Table 1 sum· 
mames the scenario results. The analysis results can help 
decide on doctrine as well as where to invest in further 
development For example, a dominant reliance on active 
defense by shooting down the ASBM by using two SM-3 
missiles leads to .2.7% probability of being hit Yet, in a 
raid situ.tion, the 2 SM-3 per Incoming ASBM doctrine 
might lead to quick depletion of available inventory. An 
alternative approach is to invest more in electronic coun-
termeasures and use only a Single SM-3, which results in 
a 7.85% probability of being hit. 
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SCENARIO SCENARIO PROBABILITY 
ASBM hits ship ASBM misses negate ASBM 
Single launch site, 1 SM-3 intercept 15.70% 1.70% 82.6% 
Single launch site, 2 SM-3 intercepts 2.7% 0.3% 97.0% 
Single launch site, EW + 1 SM-3 intercept 7.85% 9.55% 82.6% 
Single launch sire, EW + 2 SM-3 intercepts 1.35% 1.64% 97.0% 
TABLE 1. MOEs for single launch site OPSITs. 
ASBM LAUNCHED DOCTRINE SM-3 INTERCEPTS P(l OR MORE HITS) EXPECTED NUMBER 







TABLE 2.. Inventory depletion in raid OPSITs. 
ANALYSIS OF MISSILE INVENTORY 
The probability analysis demonstrated how the model can 
detennine overall SoS mission effectiveness. Additionally, 
given that missiles are limited resources, it is necessary to 
analyze the depletion of missile inventory during engage-
ment Using the Chinese as representative of other nations' 
missile capabilities, they are projected to have approxi-
mately 100 ASBM in 2010 Solomon 20ll). Since the 
paper's purpose is to demonstrate a SoS analysis method, 
the paper uses notional data for U.S. naval capabilities; 
however, it is based on the data provided by O'Rourke 
(2014). Let's assume a notional U.S. Navy Carrier Strike 
Group composed of two Ticonderoga-c1assAegis cruisers 
and two Ar/'igh Burke-class Aegis destroyers has a total 
inventory of 100 SM-3 missiles between them. The num-
ber of missiles that an enemy would launch in a saturation 
attack depends on many factors. For the sake of illustrating 
the analysis, Table 2 analyzes three scenarios of 10, 20, or 
50 missiles launched and targeted at the carrier. Each sce-
nario is analyzed for two firing doctrines of the defender 
firing either one or two interceptor missiles, listed in the 
table as single and double doctrine, respectively. The prob-
ability of one or more hits is calculated using the binomial 
distribution with the probabilities of the ASBM hitting the 
ship derived from Table 1 under the assumption ofEW 
being employed. For example, the fin;t row is calculated 
using Equation 4 as follows 
Po = 1- (~O) 0.0785(1- 0.0785)(10-0) = 0.441 
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10 0.559 0.785 
20 0.127 0.135 
20 0.805 1.570 
40 0.239 0.271 
50 0.983 3.926 
100 0.494 0.6n 
The probability of one or more hits is 1-0.441 = 0.559. 
The inventory analysis shows that in all three sce-
narios responding with a single intercept missile for each 
incoming missile results in what is likely an unsatisfac-
tory high probability of being hit. The inventory analysis 
is critical because it illustrates the asyznmetry that attack-
ers from land will likely have greater missile inventories 
than the ship-based defenders who have limited capacity 
to carry inventory. In a raid of 50 ASBMs, if the defend-
ing CSG uses two missile interceptors, then they will 
deplete their entire inventory. 
TIME ANALYSIS 
1h.is section analyzes two measures related to time. First, 
we analyze the tinting requirements to launch an inter-
ceptor missile with suJlicient time to engage the ASBM. 
Second, we analyze the delays electronic-countermea-
sures can impose on the adversary's kill chain. 
TIMING REQ.UIREMENTS 
An important measure of perfonnance (MOP) is the 
time lapse between an ASBM launch, when it is detected, 
until when a decisionto engage the interceptor missile is 
made. Current capabilities focus on engaging the ASBM 
in its mid-course or terminal phases, with the earlier the 
better. Let t ... denote the latest time at which the ASBM 
can be successfully engaged. This time depends on the 
distances the missiles must travel, and this would be cap-
tured in various OPSITs. The defending ship must detect 
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ASBM 
FICiURE 3. lime analysis for missile defense. 
the threat(I,) , track the threat (I,), compute a fire control 
solution (I.), launch the SM-3 (I,), and then the missile 
fly-out (1/ ) must all occur prior to the last point at which 
engogement is possible. This requirement is expressed as 
1,+I,+I,+I,+~'iI"" (5) 
Figure 3 projects the timing of the defensive measures 
onto the incoming missile's flight path. Note that once a 
decision is made to engoge, there may be a delay before 
launching the interceptor. 
Table 3 provides distributions for all the times that could 
be based on external, higher-fidelity models and/or actual 
test data. We can estimate the probability of not complet-
ing all tasks in sufficient time to engoge the target using this 
data. The results of 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations of the 
Markov chain indicate that 1.33% of the time, insufficient 
time is .vail.ble to engoge the target The model can be 
used to analyze scenmos and allocate time requirements 
to systems-for example, detection systems th.t can detect 
earlier, or analyses of missiles th.t can engoge earlier. 
TIME DELAYS ON ADVERSARY 
A Monte Carlo simulation is performed to analyze the 
imposed delays where the st.tes of search, detect, identify, 
and decide are modeled as exponential distributions, and 
the st.tes of boost, mid-course, and terminal phase are 
modeled as normally distributed. In Figure 4, the results 
of 5,000 replications are skewed left with • long tall to the 
right The histogram can be used to define the performance 
of. capability such as that 90% of the time the total time 
will be gre.ter than 30 minutes. Analyzing the del.ys th.t 
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can be imposed on the adver.;ary's kill chain can be used 
to allocate requirements to electronic countermeasures, 
to analyze different doctrine, and to determine what time 
is available for possible attacks on the launch sites with 
air support For an example of the analysis' use, consider 
that attacking a ship with an ASBM involves an area of 
uncertainty due to the ship's movements between when 
the ASBM is launched and when it arrives in the vicin-
ity of the ship's location when it was targeted. The area of 
uncertainty increases with the speed of the targeted ship 
and with the time delay between ASBM launch and arrival. 
Consequently, defensive meilSures that can increase the 
time del.ywill increase the area of uncertainty and affect 







FICiURE 4. Histogram of time·to-kill nace. 
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TABLE 3. Time analysis. 
DATA 
In any model, the ability to obtain data is important The 
model requires two sets of data: the transition prob-
abilities and the times before transitioning to a state. In 
some cases, the transition probabilities are derivable due 
to structural properties of the kill chain such that it is 
impossible to go from one state to another, thereby lead· 
ing to a zero transition probability. Otherwise, probability 
data for each component system in the SoS is generally 
available via either a system specific, physics-based model 
or empirical data via actual combat or operational test 
and evaluation. An example of empirical data is provided 
in Friedman (2009) who, in recounting the history of 
sensor development, describes a Navy exercise with a 
detailed description of the performance of radar systems 
and other sensors to detect incoming missiles or planes 
(Friedman, 2009, p. 236). These data are the transition 
probabilities required by the Markov chain. 
FucureWork 
The research addresses an important issue facing the 
analysis ofSoS-how to model the interactions between 
component systems-and in this case, we propose using a 
Markov model. The Markov model makes several assump-
tions that may not be valid for ASBM defense. First, the 
model assumes stationary probabilities, which means the 
probabilities do not change with respect to time or the 
state of the system. Yet, in reality, many of the probabili-
ties are Ukely dependent on the number of simultaneous 
missiles the ship must defend against, the environmental 
conditions such as sea state, weather, and distance, as well 
as the result of operational actions such as erosion of ocean 
surveillance capabilities. Addressing this valid concern 
can be done by using non-stationary probabilities that do 
change according to system state. Non·stationary prob-
abilities can be handled with multiple matrices, although 
this greatly compUcates the analysis. For example, limiting 
our discussion to changes due to distances only, we would 
expect probability of detection and state holding time to 
detect to decrease as the distances decrease because the 
signal-to-noise ratio improves. In that case, we would need 
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to have a probability transition matrix and reward matrices 
for each distance. 
Aside from non-stationary probabilities, there may also 
be bottlenecks limiting the ability of the ship to defend 
against a large salvo attack, such as inability to track many 
missiles or to engage them in time. In terms of analytical 
models to handle this problem, a queueing network analy-
sis seems most appropriate. Finally, we did not consider the 
threat assignment decision that occurs when multiple ships 
coordinate theater-wide defense. These and the related 
issues are left for future research to extend the Markov 
modeling technique and to also develop related models. 
We envision that the capability analysis of a SoS would 
be conducted with a suite of models to answer particular 
questions pertinent to the SoS design and performance. 
Conclusion 
This paper demonstrated a Markov chain modeling 
method to analyze the capabilities of a SoS for anti-ship 
ballistic missile (ASBM) defense. The model method 
starts by identifying the missions and OPS1Ts with the 
definition of appropriate MOEs and MOPs. In our par-
ticular case, we used two OPS1Ts of. single launch sce-
nario and a raid scenario. The kill chain of the adversary's 
ASBM is modeled as a stochastic process that allows 
calculation of the probabilities of successfully defending 
against a ASBM attack. The model can quickly analyze 
the advantages of various doctrine, such as whether to 
use one or two interceptor missiles. The second type of 
analysis was of the timing requirements to successfully 
defend against ASBM. A Monte Carlo simulation of the 
Markov chain was used for this analysis. The proposed 
approach provides a reasonable means to identify and 
conduct trades during capabilities-based analysis, and 
then to allocate requirements to constituent systems. 
The paper contributes to the capability analysis of SoS 
by demonstrating how to address two important require-
ments for such analysis. Fi"t, the Markov model captures 
how the perfonnance of constituent systems interact to 
provide the overall SoS performance in terms ofMOEs 
and MOPs. Second, the Markov model has few data 
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requirements, only the individual transition probabilities 
and Jime durations, both of which data can be acquired 
from constituent system models, operational tests, and 
subject matter expert estimation. For 50S capability 
analysis, the ability to integrate existing component 
models in an analytical framework, as provided by the 
Markov model, is an important contribution to develop-
ing a means to rapidly analyze a 50S. The model supports 
the allocation of requirements to constituent systems and 
the analysis of operating policies for the SoS for different 
mission scenarios. Other than simulation, modeling 
tools available to perform this type of capabilties-based 
analysis for 50S are currently lacking. 
While a realistic ASBM defense scenario is much 
more complex than depicted here, we argue there are few 
analytical tools available to engineers to analyze these 
50S. The two main approaches in practice are variations 
on subject matter expert review and simulation. In terms 
of model6delity, the Markov model presented here fills 
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